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When I encountered people from other faiths, particularly Christians, I realised 
that being an insider, more often than not, 
ambiguates one’s picture of the universe of 
faiths. Thus, I decided to embark on a jour-
ney of re-discovering other faiths, Christianity 
in particular. Hence, doing a degree at the 
University of Durham, UK, was a trans-
formative experience in the way I see not 
only Christianity but also other religions. At 
Durham, my mind opened to many theologi-
cal and philosophical questions. One of these 
questions was the question at hand, i.e. if one 
faith is true, does this mean all others are false? To me, any answer to this question 
only raised further questions, like: is truth embraceable? Do we have certain criteria 
by which truth and reality can be measured? To what extent can one distance oneself 
from one’s own background or cultural context? Can truth be relative? Out of these 
questions, this essay addresses the first, i.e. if one faith is true, does this mean all oth-
ers are false?
 ‘What is truth?’ is a question that needs to be addressed before dealing with the 
question we are concerned with here. Throughout the history of philosophical and 
theological inquiry, five major theories have emerged on the definition of ‘truth’. First, 
the ‘correspondence theory’, which states that ‘a judgement is said to be true when it 
conforms to the external reality’.1 Second, the ‘coherence theory’, which holds that 
a truth-claim necessitates a proper fit of elements, factors and propositions within a 
whole system, each element supporting the other.2 Third, the ‘constructivist theory’, 
a theory that relatives truth and looks at it as constructed by social processes, and 
If one faith is true, does this 
mean all others are false?
Mohammed Gamal Abdelnour 
Mohammed Gamal Abdelnour
Mohammed Gamal Abdelnour is a PhD student at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 
and a Faculty Member at Al-Azhar University, Cairo. This article was the winning script in the 2017 essay 
competition sponsored by the WCF. 
Mohammed Gamal Abdelnour 
interreligious Insight | 7
as historically and culturally specific.3 
Fourth, the ‘consensus theory’, which 
proposes that truth is whatever is agreed 
upon or might come to be agreed upon 
by a certain group.4 Fifth, the ‘pragmatic 
theory’, which concludes that truth is 
verified and confirmed by the results of 
putting one’s concepts into practice.5
For being the most widely believed, 
most long-standing,6 and most inter-
cultural and interdisciplinary theory, this 
essay adopts the ‘correspondence theory’. 
In the field of philosophy, the renowned 
ancient Greek philosophers, Socrates (d. 
399 BCE), Plato (d. 347 BCE) and 
Aristotle (d. 322 BCE), all subscribed 
to it. They believed that the truth or 
falsity of a representation is decided by 
how it relates to the world of ‘things’, by 
whether or not it precisely describes those 
things.7 Crossing the Greek philosophy 
and culture to Muslim philosophy and 
culture, in his book Kitab al-Shifa (the 
Book of Healing), Avicenna (d. 1037 
CE), defined truth as: ‘what is corre-
sponds in the mind to what is outside it’.8 
Crossing again the Islamic philosophical 
and cultural borders to Christian theol-
ogy, Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274 CE), says: 
‘a judgement is said to be true when it 
conforms to the external reality’.9 
While the five stated theories, 
whether implicitly or explicitly, agree 
on the reachability of the ultimate truth, 
Descartes (d. 1650 CE), goes further 
to question the truth’s embraceability. 
Descartes speaks about the embrace-
ability of the ultimate truth in this way: 
I say that I know this, not that 
I can conceive or comprehend 
it; because it is possible to know 
that God is infinite and all 
powerful although our soul, 
being finite, cannot comprehend 
or conceive Him. In the same 
way, we can touch a mountain 
with our hands but we cannot 
put our arms around it, as we 
could put them around a tree or 
something else not too large for 
them. To comprehend something 
is to embrace it in one’s thought; 
to know something is to touch it 
with one’s thought.10
‘We can touch a mountain with our 
hands but we cannot put our arms around 
it’, this statement is the crux of our pres-
ent discussion. Two conclusions can be 
deduced from this Cartesian quotation. 
First, the transcendence of the ultimate 
truth. That is to say that the ultimate 
truth is too transcendent to be fully 
conceived and wholly encompassed by 
a certain faith. Second, the deficiency of 
most humans to fully grasp the ultimate 
truth. This is not to devalue the reason 
and intellect of humans, but rather to 
say that the minds of humans are largely 
shaped by their environments, upbring-
ings, life experiences … etc. In other 
words, each human being lives a life 
that subconsciously shapes the way he/
she believes and thinks. Therefore, the 
more one gets rid of such influences, the 
more one comes closer to realizing the 
ultimate truth; yet reaching such a level 
of objectivity, in most cases, lies outside 
the capability of most of the humans. 
Given the preceding, there are two 
major deficiencies that indicate the 
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end up reaching different levels of the 
ultimate truth. 
While Rumi’s version of the story 
of the elephant indicates an ‘environ-
mental’ deficiency, another version 
of the same story gives an indication 
of a ‘personal’ deficiency. This ‘per-
sonal’ version of the story is told by 
the renowned Muslim theologian Abu 
Hamid Al-Ghazali (d. 1111 CE). While, 
in Rumi’s version, the visitors’ inad-
equate perception of the elephant is 
due to the darkness of the room at 
night, Al-Ghazali describes those visitors 
as ‘physically blind’.12 Therefore, one 
may conclude that, for Al-Ghazali, most 
human beings are incapable of grasping 
truth in its entirety due to personal inad-
equacies. But, for Rumi, this is a matter 
of environmental influences. Although 
they both differ as regards to the causes 
of such prevalent inability – personal in 
the case of Al-Ghazali and environmen-
tal in the case of Rumi – they come to 
the same conclusion, i.e. human beings, 
more often than not, are incompetent to 
access the perfection and fullness of the 
ultimate truth. 
human being’s inability to reach the 
entirety of truth. These deficiencies are 
either environmental or personal. The 
old allegory of the ‘elephant in dark-
ness’ which had its roots in the Buddhist 
tradition, provides a clear demonstra-
tion of the environmental deficiency. 
According to Rumi’s (d. 1273 CE) ver-
sion of the story, a group of Hindus 
brings an elephant to a town at night. 
People of the town, impatient to wait 
until the morning, go to the dark room 
where the elephant is kept. Unable to 
see the animal, they can only perceive it 
through touching. Upon touching dif-
ferent parts of the elephant’s body, each 
person describes the elephant differently. 
One, who has touched its ear, describes 
it as similar to a fan. Another, who has 
touched its trunk, says the elephant 
is like a gutter. A third man, who has 
touched its leg, describes the elephant as 
similar to a pillar. Finally, a person who 
has touched its back describes it as like 
a bed. If each of them had a candle at 
hand, there would be no difference in 
their statements.11  
That is the environmental/contex-
tual deficiency. To put it more clearly, 
the inability to conceive the reality of 
the elephant is not due to an inherent 
disability in human mind per se, but 
due to the darkness/environment sur-
rounding it. This darkness caused by the 
‘night’, constitutes a thick veil prevent-
ing those approaching the elephant from 
the full comprehension of the truth of 
the elephant. The extent to which one 
can get rid of such veils and be freed 
from such constraints varies from one 
individual to another. Therefore, people 
Blind monks examining an elephant, by Hanabusa Itchō, 
Wikimedia Commons
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paths to the one divine reality and that 
Christ is one revelation among many 
equally important revelations’.16 
What is of major relevance to our 
essay question is the Pluralist position. 
Pluralism sees all religions as valid and 
legitimate when viewed within their 
own cultural background. Thus, no sin-
gle religion has a monopoly on truth, 
but all represent varying experiences 
of the Ultimate Reality. The father of 
Pluralism, John Hick, argues that adher-
ents of different religions approach the 
same God, but from various historical 
and cultural standpoints,17 and conse-
quently, ‘each concrete historical divine 
personality – Yahweh, the heavenly 
Father and the Qur’anic Allah – is a 
joint product of the universal divine 
presence and a particular historically 
formed mode of constructive religious 
imagination’.18 Thus religions are all 
valid paths towards God. Therefore, if a 
In modern philosophical theol-
ogy, the conflicting truth-claims led to 
the emergence of different typologies 
to study the phenomenon of truth-
claims. The most common typology that 
has widely been used in this area is 
the Threefold Typology, first identified 
by Alan Race, in his book: Christians 
and Religious Pluralism.13 This typol-
ogy is composed of three main types: 1. 
Exclusivism, which states that only those 
who hear the Gospel proclaimed and 
explicitly confess Christ are the bearers 
of the truth, as they are to absorb the 
wholeness of reality and firmly are on the 
only valid path to salvation;14 Inclusivism, 
which refers to that Christ is the norma-
tive revelation of God, and the bringer of 
the ultimate reality, yet although reality 
fully exists in Christianity, it exists in 
other religions, but not at the same level 
of fullness;15 3. Pluralism, which states 
that ‘all religions are equal and valid 
Temple of All Religions in Kazan, Russia, Wikimedia Commons  
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While the Hickian position rela-
tivizes truth-claims, the contemporary 
Muslim Pluralist, Seyyed Hussain Nasr, 
calls for revitalizing it. Nasr criticises 
Hick’s Pluralism for undermining the 
value of ‘truth’ and leading to reduc-
tive Pluralism. Nasr argues that truth is 
not to be relativized, in order to resolve 
the problem of truth-claims; but to be 
revitalized. Adnan conceptualises Nasr’s 
view in these words: 
Nasr, on the other hand, would 
argue that there is a need for 
rediscovery of tradition which 
will provide a fresh outlook on 
the function and usefulness of 
religion. Hence, the intellectual 
activity in this century should 
be directed not to those engage-
ments which help to relativize 
the ‘truth’ of religions, such as 
conventional religious Pluralism, 
but to those, such as the peren-
nial philosophy, which revitalizes 
the ‘truths’ of religions’.26 
With Hick’s and Nasr’s proposals, 
a number of comparisons can be made. 
First, Hick thinks that people are the 
major participants in the construction of 
faiths, so for Hick producing ‘truth’ lies 
within the capability of human beings,27 
whereas Nasr believes that ‘truth’, 
regardless of religious truth, is sacred, 
and it exclusively comes from God. 
Thus, God is the generator of ‘truth’. 
So, ‘What humans must do is to bow 
before this truth. We should not attempt 
to create a ‘truth’. What we can do is to 
be a mirror of that ‘truth’ and reflect it 
as it is’.28 Second, Hick’s conceptualisa-
person is born within a Muslim family, 
he is likely to be a Muslim, and the same 
applies to any other religion, since birth 
accidents have effectual roles to play 
here. With this in mind, to say that a 
particular religion is inferior to another, 
or less salvific than the other, is just a 
form of cultural narrow-mindedness.19 
Thus, one should not then conceptualise 
religions as rivals, vying with each other, 
and we should stop making mono-
lithic claims to truth. Lastly, if all this is 
accepted, we should abstain from asking 
that question, ‘which is the true, or tru-
est, religion?’20
Hick believes that ‘the great post-
axial faiths constitute different ways of 
experiencing, conceiving and living in 
relation to an ultimate divine Reality 
which transcends all our varied visions 
of it’,21 this divine reality is the ground 
on which all religious experiences take 
place. Therefore, Hick’s thesis is based 
on four premises. First, there is only 
one divine reality, which Hick calls ‘the 
Real’. Second, no single religion has a 
full and direct conception of the Real. 
Third, each religion represents its own 
way of experiencing the Real. Fourth, 
the Real transcends all descriptions and 
human imagination.22 As a consequence, 
Hick believes that correct belief about 
the Hereafter is not necessary for salva-
tion.23 This is not to say that there are 
no true answers to the disputable issues 
between different religions, yet to say 
that knowing such answers is beyond 
our reach.24 Thus, we must not interpret 
the views that oppose one another liter-
ally, yet mythologically, in order to avoid 
falling into contradictions.25
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a full interpretation of the universal 
truth.32 Fifth, although Nasr agrees with 
Hick in that there will be a religious 
transformation in the coming centu-
ry, he remarkably disagrees with him 
regarding the features of such a trans-
formation. While for Hick that trans-
formation would mean that the current 
boundaries between the living religions 
will vanish,33 for Nasr there will be a re-
discovery or revitalisation of traditions, 
that will ensure the peaceful survival of 
individuals as well as societies, but the 
boundaries between religions will not 
vanish, yet each religion will preserve its 
own identity and maintain its particular-
ities.34 To overcome the problems occa-
sioned by the absolute truth claims of 
each religion, Nasr proposes the concept 
of the ‘relative absolute’35: it is to ‘make 
us able to understand the ‘formal’ dif-
ferences, because they possess different 
possibilities in their celestial archetypes. 
Yet they are united in their essence, since 
they have stemmed from the same origin 
tion of religious Pluralism could work 
effectively in certain cultures, initially, 
the Western culture. Hence, it is ‘more 
culture-specific rather than ‘trans-cul-
tural’, but Nasr’s Pluralism seems less 
culture-specific. Therein, he seems to 
pay considerable attention to universal-
ity, yet not in the account of locality.29 
Third, whereas Hick thinks that there 
is no sacred reality, meaning that reality 
circles everything including God,30 Nasr 
believes that: 
God as Ultimate Reality is not 
only the Supreme Person but also 
the source of all that is, hence 
at once Supra-Being and Being, 
God as Person and the Godhead 
or Infinite Essence of which 
Being is the first determination. 
Both He or She and It and yet 
beyond all pronominal categories, 
God as Ultimate Reality is the 
Essence which is the origin of all 
forms, the Substance compared 
with which all else is accident, 
the One who alone is and who 
stands even above the category of 
being as usually understood.31
Fourth, Hick approaches the ques-
tion as a pluralist whereas Nasr approach-
es it as a perennialist. Although the two 
terms are often used interchangeably, 
there is a subtle difference between the 
two departures. Even though both agree 
that there is no single true religion, 
they differ as regards to the universal 
truth. That is to say that while pluralism 
endorses a partial understanding of the 
universal truth, perennialism holds that 
each religion provides in its own terms 
To seek parts of the truth wherever it arises
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peoples’ ‘personal’ inabilities to absorb the 
ultimate truth or deficiencies caused by 
their ‘environments’, as explained in the 
elephant allegory. Taken together, these 
findings support strong recommendation 
to the continuous ‘seeking’ of truth, in 
tandem with ‘speaking’ of it in the way 
one believes it to be. That is to say that 
although I, as a Muslim, believe that the 
Qur’an gives me access to guidance and 
truth, I still believe that absorbing the 
Qur’anic truth itself is not static; it rather 
is dynamic, discursive and progressive. 
The Qur’an itself is believed to keep 
providing its readers with new insights 
that were never uncovered before to its 
previous readers. This suggests that the 
ultimate truth that humans seek after is 
not necessarily fully present yet in their 
minds, and that the Qur’an itself still 
have potential readings to offer. At the 
same time, it urges its readers to seek bits 
and pieces of truth wherever it arises. 
Therefore, theology is to be in the ser-
vice of the ultimate truth, not the other 
way around. 
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